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DTSCUSS 
1. This is a private suit for violation of the reporting 
requirements of § 13(d) of the Williams Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d). 
Section D(d) requires a person who acquires 5 percent of any 
equity security registered under the Securities Exchange Act 
to make prompt public reports of his acquisitions and intentions. 
l. • 
The DC (Doyle) entered summary judgment for Petitioner 
because Respondent had shown no irrep~rable injury. CA7 
reversed and ordered entry of summary judgment and injunctive 
relief for Respondent. 
2. FACTS. Respondent, a publicly held corporation based 
in Mosinee, Wisconsin, manufactures paper products and plastics. 
Petitioner, a Mosinee businessman, decided in early 1971 that 
Respondent's stock was a good investment. By May 17 he had s% ~~ 
acquired 5 percent of the oustanding common stock. The DC 
~1-? 
accepted as undisputed Petitioner's contention that he was 
unaware that the Wil ~ams Act reporting requirements applied 
""'--== ~ ~ -=<::: =-- ' 
to 5 percent ownership. (In Dec. 1970 the triggering provision 
of the Act had been amended from 10% to 5%). He therefore 
did ~ot report his acquisitions within the 10 days required 
by§ 13(d), but in July he learned of the 5 percent reporting 
re and immediately put his accountants to work 
preparing the 13D sc~edul~. He made no further purchase orders ~ 
in Respondent's stock. The 13D schedule was filed August 25, ~ ; 
' ~ 2) 
and subsequently amended. It stated that Petitioner was 
~O ~~nsidering making a tender offer. Both the DC and CA7 rejected 
~- Respondent's contention that the 13D schedule contained material 
factual misstatements. 
3. DECISIONS BELOW. Petitioner admitted that he had 
violated the Williams Act by failing to file the 13D schedule 
on time. The only issue was the propriety of the relief 
Respondent requested - an injunction against purchasing more 
I 
.j, 
stock, voting the shares already purchased, or seeking to 
gain control; damages; and divestiture· of an unspecified number 
~ 
of shares. The DC held that Respondent had introduced proof 
of only one form of injury from Petitioner's delayed filing: 
"the anxiety of its employees and shareholders about a future 
of 
change in control/the corporation." The court concluded that 
this anxiety was the sort that would accompany any potential 
change in management, but was not the kind of injury that the 
Williams Act was designed to remedy. The court referred to 
legislative history indicating that Congress wanted to balance 
the regulation of incumbent management and those bidding for 
takeover. Second, the DC noted that Petitioner had made no 
attempt to conceal his purchases and that brokers and other 
businessmen were aware of them. Petitioner had not. intentionally 
evaded the reporting requirement; all information had been avail-
able since Sept. 29, 1971; and Petitioner had never proceeded 
with a tender offer. 
CA7 accepted the DC's interpretation of the facts but 
took a broader view of the purpose of§ 13(d). It held that 
the purpose of the reporting requirement is "to alert the 
marketplace to every large, rapid aggregation or accumulation 
of securities, regardless of technique employed, which might 
represent a potential shift in corporate control," quoting 
GAF Corp. v. Milstein, 453 F.2d 709,. 717 (2d Cir. 1971). It 
held that Petitioner's failure to report his acquisition on 
time allowed him to continue purchasing securities in a market 
4. 
that had not been adequately warned of his potential power to 
gain control of Respondent. CA7 found that Respondent had been 
'1\. 11 irreparably injured because its capabilit.Y to respond to 
Petitioner's purchases was compromised by his delay in revealing -· ----
all the facts about his intentions. But, the court added, there --
is no need to show irreparable injury to the corporation. 
Injunctive relief would be appropriate solely on the ground 
that the corporation is the "prime enforcer" of the reporting 
requirements, acting on behalf of its shareholders and the 
investing public. Accordingly, CA7 reversed t he summary judgment 
entered for Petitioner and remanded the case with instructions 
d CD · · · p · · f · 1 · § 13 (d) to enter a ecree enJo~n~ng et~t~oner rom v~o at~ng 
rom voting the stock he purchased between the date 
he should have filed the 13D schedule and the date he actua~ly 
filed it, to remain in effect for five years. The purpose 
of the voting restrictions was "to neutralize [Petitioner's] 
violation of the Act and to deny him the benefit of his 
wrongdoing." 
Judge Pell dissented, arguing that Petitioner's "technical" 
and unintentional violation of § 13(d) did not justify such a 
J "harsh injunctive penalty." His reasons largely echoed those 
of the DC. 
4. CONTENTIONS. (1) Petitioner says CA7's decision is 
in conflict with an unreported opinion ·of CAS, Tri-State Motor 
Transit Co. v. National City Lines, No. 73-867 (Apr. 4, 1974). 
Tri-State,reproduced in an appendix to Respondent's brief in 
5. 
opposition, affirmed a district court's refusal to grant 
' ' 
injunctive relief because the violation of § 13(d) was neither 
deliberate, covert, nor conspiratorial. Respondent points out, 
as did Judge Pell, that Tri-State is unreported under CAS's 
local 
~rule depriving certain per curiam opinions of precedential 
value. 
(2) Petitioner contends that CA7's decision creates for 
\. \ 
§ 13(d), ~hich 1bontains no remedy, a "lower threshold for . 
imposition of penalties than exists in similar areas of 
securities law." It claims that, in general, .even the SEC 
must show reasonable expectation of future violations as a 
prerequisite for an injunction. Respondent says the continued 
viability of this rule is subject to question, citing SEC v. 
Great American Indus., Inc., 407 F.2d 453 (2d Cir.) cert. 
denied, 395 U.S. 920 (1969), in which CA2 granted the SEC 
an injunction against repetition of allegedly inadvertent 
reporting errors. Aside from this argument, Respondent says 
it is appropriate to consider the public interest when balancing 
the equities between parties to a proceeding. Instead of 
allowing injunctive relief only if the plaintiff itself can 
show specific irreparable harm, relief should be granted on 
a showing of harm to the public because private actions are 
a "necessary supplement" to the SEC's limited enforcement 
resources. 
(3) Petitioner argues that by ordering injunctive relief 




longstanding rules governing the grant of injunctive relief. 
Petitioner says the decision"probably" conflicts with this 
Court's decisi~ns on the availability of injunctions, citing 
Beacon Theatres v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500 (1959), and 
Pennsylvania v. Wheeling & Belmont Bridge Co., 54 U.S. (13 
How.) 518 (1851). Respondent says that these cases did not 
involve the "private attorney general" aspect of suits to enjoin 
violations of statutes written to protect the public. 
5. DISCUSSION. Several recent securities cases have 
taken account of public in~ry in deciding whether to grant 
private injunctive relief. E.g., Ronson Corp. v. Liguifin 
Aktiengesellschaft, 483 F.2d 846, 849 (3d Cir. 1973) (§ 14(e)); 
Gulf & Western Industries, Inc. v. Great Atlantic & Pacific 
Tea Co., 476 F.2d 687 (2d Cir. 1973) (§ 14(e)); Sisa.k v. Wings 
& Wheels Express, Inc., 1971 CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. ~f 92,991, 
at 90,670 (S.D.N.Y. 1970) (§ 13(d)) (Frankel). The principle 
at least ore ~ 
also has foundation in~this Court's decisions. 
Virginian Ry. Co. v. Railway Employees System Federation No. 
40, 300 U.S. 515, 552 (1973). It seems especially appropriate 
in the enforcement of a statute designed to ·protect investors 
rather than to affect the balance of advantage between incumbent 
management and outside insurgents. 
Neither the parties nor the courts below have questioned 
the existence of an implied right of action in favor of the 
issuer under § 13(d). CA2 has held there is such an implied 
right of action, by analogy to J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 
~
I \......,./ 
U.S. 426 (1964), since § 13(d) requires the purchaser to 
, . +o 
send his report to the issuer as well asAthe SEC and each 
exchange where the stock is traded. This is a sensible 
application of J.I. Case. 
There is a response. 
I • 
11/18/74 Clark Opns in petn appx; 
DC opn also reported 
at 354 F. Supp. 686 
BENCH MEMO 
TO: Mr. Justice Powell DATE: April 14, 1975 
FROM: 
? J:,.ewi~li, -::fr. 
No. 74-417 Rondeau v. Mosinee Paper Corp. 
I recommend reversing the Court of Appeals' judgment 
requiring an injunction "sterilizing" the stock Rondeau 
bought during the period in which he was delinquent in 
filing a 13(d) report. In light of the reasons it offers 
for r equiring this decree, the court effectively has held 
that every delinquency in filing a 13(d) report requires 
such "sterilization". I cannot see how such a per se 
rule is appropriate. 
Section 13(d) of the Securities Exchange Act ~arries ----/l '"' no special penalty or enforcement provision. The general 
-------------~--------------
penalty statute for the Exchang~ Act applies: it allows the 
SEC to seek a fine up to $10,000 and imprisonment up to 2 
years for any violation. 15 U.S.C. § 78ff. In addition, the 
SEC can bring an action for injunctive rel ief. 15 U.S.C. 
§ 78u(e). It does make sense to allow the issuer a private 
right of action to enforce the reporting requirement, since 
the issuer's transfer records will provide the first 
indication that someone has acquired 5% ownership, and quick 
action is necessary to vindicate the statutory purpose. The 
issue in this case is what relief is apprropriate in such an 
action. 
The purpose of the 13(d) reporting requirement seems 
relatively clear from legislative history. It was not 
2. 
intended to protect incumbent management from takeover bids, 
but to protect the marketplace. Any rapid aggregation of 
securities can affect the market price, 
a · ; and any threatened change in the control of a corporation 
affects the value of its stock as an investment. The reporting 
requirement was designed to alert the marketplace to a rapid 
aggregatiun of stock that carries with it a potential for 
It protects stockholders by giving them information 
]
, control. 
that may affect a decision to sell, hold, or purchase stock. 
It also alerts the corporation and its incumbent management 
to the potential for a takeover bid or proxy fight, but this 
effect seems to have been a byproduct of the protection for 
investors. 
Seen in this light, § 13(d) does not support the gloss 
the Court of Appeals put on it. The CA thought that permanent 
injunctive relief was necessary for two reasons: (1) the 
corporation had been harmed because it was delayed in making 
a response to Rondeau's purchases, and (2) Rondeau must be 
deprived of the benefit of his wrongdoing, i , ~., the utility 
of the stock he purchased between the filing deadline and the 
date he actually filed the report. The first reason would 
support a temporary injunction, designed to postpone a takeover 




information they need before the outsider proceeds with his 
' . 
purchasing and possible takeover. But I see no relation 
between the harm from delay and an injunction that sterilizes 
,---.- ----
the stock for five years. The second reason--depriving Rondeau 
of the fruits of his wrongdoing--seems to assume that acquiring 
more stock during the period of delinquency was illegal. As 
I read 13(d), there is no prohibition on acquiring stock 
while in violation of the reporting requirements. Again, 
prohibiting further acquisitions could be an appropriate 
feature of a temporary injunction, because it would keep the 
outsiderfrom buying stock at low prices when the prices would 
be higher if his plans were known. But I cannot see how the 
sterilization decree would remedy any harm done to shareholders 
during that period of time. Its effect will be to reduce the 
number of shares required to control the corporation. This 
effect is slight in this case, where only 3% of the stock is 
involved, but in other cases a sterilization decree could 
effect a substantial change in the number of shares required 
to elect a slate of officers or approve a merger. Such an 
effect would benefit incumbent management, and it may or may 
not benefit shareholders generally. That is not to say 
th~t a sterilization decree could never be appropriate, but 
it does suggest that one should not be granted as a matter 
of course. The standard relief should probably be a temporary 
injunction, combined with a general injunction against future 
4. 
violations. Perhaps there should also be an action for damages 
on behalf of shareholders who sold at an artifically low 
price because of the delayed disclosure, but that issue 
is not presented here. 
Respondent urges the Court to remand for a full trial 
in the event it cannot affirm the CA's order for entry of 
full injunctive relief. That argument is foreclosed by this 
Court's practice on cross-petitions. In the absence of a 
cross-petition, the respondent can present any ground (raised 
below) in support of the CA's judgment, but it may not urge 
modification of the judgment. The CA reversed the summary 
judgment entered in petitioner's favor, and ordered entry of 
summary judgment in respondent's favor. To hold that there 
was a dispute of material fact requiring a trial would 
necessitate reversing that judgment. Respondent therefore 
cannot attack the propriety of summary judgment or the accuracy 
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
No. 74-415 
Francis A. Rondeau, ) On Writ of Certiorari to the 
Petitioner, United States Court of 
v. Appeals for the Seventh 
Mosinee Paper Corporation. Circuit. 
[June -, 1975] 
MR. CHIEF JusTICE BuRGER delivered the opinion of 
the Court. 
We granted certiorari in this case to determine 
whether a showing of irreparable harm is necessary for 
a private litigant to obtain injunctive relief in a suit 
under § 13 (d) of the Williams Act, 15 U. S. C. § 78m 
(d). The Court of Appeals held that it was not. We 
reverse. 
I 
Respondent Mosinee Paper Corporation is a Wiscon-
sin company engaged in the manufacture and sale of 
paper, paper products, and plastics. Its principal place 
of business is located in Mosinee, Wisconsin, and its only 
class of equity security is common stook which is regis-
tered under § 12 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 
15 U. S. C. § 781. At all times relevant to this litiga-
tion there were slightly more than 800,000 shares of 
such stock outstanding. 
In April 1971 petitioner Francis A. Rondeau, a Mosi-
nee businessman, began making large purchases of re-
spondent's common stock in the over-the-counter mar-
ket. Some of the purchases were in his own name; 
others were in the name of businesses and a foundation 
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known to be controlled by him. By May 17, 1971, peti-
tioner had acquired 40,413 shares of respondent's stock, 
which constituted more than 5% of those outstanding. 
He was therefore required to comply with the disclosure 
provisions of the Williams Act/ by filing a Schedule 13D 
1 The Williams Act, which amended the Securities Exchange Act 
~f 1934, provides in relevant part: 
" (d) ( 1) Any person who, after acquiring directly or indirectly the 
beneficial ownership of any equity security of a class which is reg-
istered pursuant to Section 12 of this title, or any equity security of 
an insurance company which would have been required to be so reg-
istered except for the exemption contained in Section 12 (g) (2) (G) 
of this title, or any equity security issued by a closed-end investment 
company registered under the Investment Company Act of 1904, is 
directly or indirectly the beneficial owner of more than 5 per centum 
of such class shall, within ten days after such acquisition, send to 
the issuer of the security at its principal executive office, by reg-
istered or certified mail, send to each exchange where the security 
is traded, and file wi.th the Commission, a statement containing such 
of the following information, and such additional information, as the 
Commission may by rules and regulations prescribe as necessary 
br appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of 
investors-
" (A) the background and identity of all persons by whom or on 
whose behalf the purchases have been or are to be effected; 
"(B) the source and amount of the funds or other consideration· 
used or to be used in making the purchases, and if any part of the· 
purchase price or proposed purchase price is represented or is to be 
represented by funds or other consideration borrowed or otherwise· 
obtained for the purpose of acquiring, holding, or trading such 
security, a description of the transaction and the names of the· 
parties thereto, except that where a source of funds is a loan made 
in the ordmary course of business by a bank, as defined in Section 
3 (a) (6) of this title, if the person filing such statement so requests,. 
the name of the bank, shall not be made available to the public; 
" (C) if the purpose of the purchasers or prospective purchases is 
to acquire control of the busin.ess of the issuer of the securities, any-
J?lans or pro,t>osals which such persons may have to liquidate such. 
7 4-415-0PINlON 
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with respondent and the Securities and Exchange Com-
mission within 10 days. That form would have dis-
closed, among other things, the number of shares bene-
ficially owned by petitioner, the source of the funds used 
to purchase them, and petitioner's purpose in making 
the purchases. 
Petitioner did not file a Schedule 13D but continued 
to purchase substantial blocks of respondent's stock; by 
July 30, 1971, he had acquired more than 60,000 shares. 
On that date the chairman of respondent's board of di-
rectors informed him by letter that his activity had 
"given rise to numerous rumors" and "seems to have 
created some problems under the Federal Securities 
Laws .... " Upon receiving the letter petitioner im-
mediately stopped placing ordzrs for respondent's stock 
and consulted his attorney. On August 25, 1971, he 
filed a Schedule 13D which, in addition to the other 
issuer, to sell its assets to or merge it with any other persons, or to 
make any other major change in its business or corporate structure; 
"(D) the number of shares of such security which are benefi-
cially owned, and the number of shares concerning which there is a 
right to acquire, directly or indirectly, by (i) such person, and (ii) 
by each associate of such person, giving the name and address of 
each such associate; and 
"(E) information as to any contracts arrangements or understand-
ings with any person with reF:pect to any securities of the issuer, 
including but not limited to transfer of any of the securities, joint 
ventures, loan or option arrangements, puts or calls, guaranties of 
loans, guaranties against loss or guaranties of profits, division of 
losses or profits, or the giving or withholding of proxies, naming the 
persons with whom such contracts, arrangements, or understandings 
have been entered into, and giving the details thereof." 82 Stat. 
454, 456 ; 15 U. S. C. § 78m(d) . 
The Commission requires the purpose of the transaction to be dis-
closed in every Schedule 13D, regardless of an intention to acquire-
control and make major changes in its structure. See 17 CFR 
§240, 13d- 1, -101 (1974), 
74-415-0PINION 
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required disclosures, described the "Purpose of Trans~ 
action" as follows: 
"Francis A. Rondeau determined during early part 
of 1971 that the common stock of Issuer [respond-
ent] was undervalued in the over-the-count.er mar-
ket and represented a good investment vehicle for 
future income and appreciation. Francis A. Ron-
deau and his associates presently propose to seek 
to acquire additional common stock of the Issuer in 
order to obtain effective control of the Issuer, but 
such investments as originally determined were and 
are not necessarily made with this objective in mind. 
Consideration is currently being given to making a 
public cash tender offer to the shareholders of the 
Issuer at a price which will reflect current quoted 
prices for such stock with some premium added." 
Petitioner also stated that, in the event that he did ob-
tain control of respondent, he would consider making 
changes in management "in an effort to provide a l3oard 
of Directors which is more representative of all of the 
shareholders, particularly those outside of present man-
agement . . . ." One month later petitioner amended 
the form to reflect more accurately the allocation of 
shares between himself and his companies. 
On August 27 respondent sent a letter to its share-
holders informing them of the disclosures in petitioner's 
Schedule 13D.2 The letter stated that by his "tardy 
filing" petitioner had "withheld the information to which 
you [the shareholders] were entitled for more than two 
months, in violation of federal law." In addition, while 
2 Respondent simultaneously issued a press release containing the 
same information. Almost immediately the price of its stock jumped 
to $19-$21 per share. A few days later 1t dropped back to the pre-
vailing price of $1'2.50-$14.00 per share, where it remained. 
74-415--0PINION 
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agreeing that "recent market prices have not reflected 
the real value of your Mosinee stock," respondent's man-
agement could "see little in Mr. Rondeau's background 
that would qualify him to offer any meaningful guid-
ance to a Company in the highly technical and com-
petitive paper industry." 
Six days later respondent initiated this suit in the 
United States District Court for the Western District of 
Wisconsin. Its complaint named petitioner, his com-
panies, and two banks which had financed some of peti-
tioner's purchases as defendants and alleged that they 
were engaged in a scheme to defraud respondent and its 
shareholders in violation of the securities laws. It alleged 
further that shareholders who had "sold shares without 
the information which defendants were required to dis-
close lacked information material to their decision to sell 
or hold," and that respondent "was unable to communi-
cate such information to its shareholders, and to take 
such actions as their interest required." Respondent 
prayed for an injunction prohibiting petitioner and his 
codefendants from voting or pledging their stock and 
from acquiring additional shares, requiring them to divest 
themselves of stock which they already owned, and for 
damages. A motion for a preliminary injunction was 
filed with the complaint but later withdrawn. 
After three months of pretrial proceedings petitioner 
moved for summary judgment. He readily conceded 
that he had violated the Williams Act, but contended 
that the violation was due to a lack of familiarity with 
the securities laws and that neither respondent nor its· 
shareholders had been harmed. The District Court 
agreed. It found no material issues of fact to exist re-
garding petitioner's lack of willfulness in failing to timely 
file a Schedule 13D, concluding that he discovered his 
' . 
74-415-0PINION 
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obligation to do so on July 30, 1971,3 and that there was 
no basis in the record for disputing his claim that he first 
considered the possibility of obtaining control of respond-
ent some time after that date. The District Court there-
fore held that petitioner and his codefendants "did not 
engage in intentional covert, and conspiratorial conduct 
in failing to timely file the 13D Schedule." 4 
Similarly, although accepting respondent's contention 
that its management and shareholders suffered anxiety 
as a result of petitioner's activities and that this anxiety 
was exacerbated by his failure to disclose his intentions 
until August 1971, the District Court concluded that 
similar anxiety "could be expected to accompany any 
change in management," and was "a predictable conse-
quence of shareholder democracy." It fell far short of 
the irreparable harm necessary to support an injunction 
and no other harm was revealed by the record; as 
amended, petitioner's Schedule 13D disclosed all of the 
information to which respondent was entitled, and he 
had not proceeded with a tender offer. Moreover, in the 
view of the District Court even if a showing of irrepara-
ble harm were not required in all cases under the securi-
ties laws, petitioner's lack of bad faith and the absence 
3 The District Court pointed out that prior to December 10, 1970, 
a Schedule 13D was not required until a person's holdings exceeded 
10% of a corporation's outstanding equity securities, see Pub. L. 
No. 91-567, 84 Stat. 1497, and credited petitioner's testimony that 
he believed the 10% requirement was still in effect at the time he 
made his purchases. Indeed, the rhairman of respondent's board 
of cfirectors was not familiH with the Williams Act's filing require-
ment until shortly before he sent the July 30, 1971 letter. 
4 The District Court also concluded that respondent's manage-
ment was not unaware of petitioner's activities with respect to its 
stock. It found that by .July 1971, there was considerable "street 
talk" among brokers, bankers, and busmessmen regarding his pur-· 
chases and that the chairman of respondent's board had been moni-
toring them. 
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of damage to respondent made this "a particularly in-
appropriate occasion to fashion equitable relief . . .. " 
Thus, although petitioner had committed a technical vio~ 
lation of the Williams Act, the District Court held that 
respondent was entitled to no relief and entered summary 
judgment against it. 5 
The Court of Appeals reversed with one judge di~ 
senting. The majority stated that it was "giving effect" 
to the District Court's findings regarding the circum-
stances of petitioner's violation of the Williams Act,6 but 
concluded that those findings showed harm to respondent 
because "it was delayed in its efforts to make any neces-
sary response to" petitioner's potential to take control of 
the company. In any event, the majority was of the 
view that respondent "need net show irreparable harm 
as a prerequisite to obtaining permanent injunctive relief 
in view of the fact that as issuer of the securities it is in 
the best position to assure that the filing requirements 
of the Williams Act are being timely and fully complied 
with and to obtain speedy and forceful remedial action 
when necessary." 500 F. 2d 1011, 1016- 1017. The 
Court of Appeals remanded the case to the District Court 
with instructions that it enjoin petitioner and his co~ 
defendants from further violations of the Williams Act 
and from voting the shares purchased between the due 
date of the Schedule 13D and the date of its filing for 
a period of five years. It considered "such an injunctive 
decree appropriate to neutralize [petitioner's] violation 
of the Act and to deny him the benefit of his wrong-
doing." 500 F . 2d, at 1017. 
5 The District Court al~o dismissed respondent 's claims that peti-
tioner had violated other provisions of the Securities Laws. Review 
of these ruling;;: was not sought in the Court of Appeals, and they 
are not now before us. 
6 The Court of Appeals also agreed with the District Court that 
t he disclosures in petitioner's amended Schedule 13D were adequate. 
' . 
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We granted certiorari to resolve an apparent conflict 
among the courts of appeals and because of the impor-
tance of the question presented to private actions under 
the Federal Securities Laws. We disagree with the Court 
of Appeals' conclusion that the traditional standards for 
extraordinary equitable relief do not apply in these cir-
cumstances, and reverse. 
II 
As in the District Court and the Court of Appeals, it 
is conceded here that petitioner's delay in filing the 
Schedule 13D constituted a violation of the Williams Act. 
The narrow issue before us is whether this record sup-
ports the grant of injunctive relief, a remedy whose basis 
"in the federal courts has always been irreparable harm 
and inadequacy of legal remedies." Beacon Theatres, 
Inc. v. Westover, 359 U. S. 500, 506-507 (1959). 
The Court of Appeals' conclusion that respondent suf-
fered "harm" sufficient to require sterilization of peti-
tioner's stock need not long detain us. The purpose of 
the Williams Act is to insure that public shareholders 
who are confronted by a cash tender offer for their stock 
will not be required to respond without adequate infor-
mation regarding the qualifications and intentions of the 
offering party.7 By requiring disclosure of information 
7 The Senate Report describes the dilemma facing such a share-
holder as follows: 
"He has many alternatives. He can tender all of his shares im-
mediately and hope they all are purchased. However, if the offer 
is for less than all the outstanding shares, perhaps only a part of 
them will be taken. In these instances, he will remain a shareholder 
in the company, under a new management which he has helped to 
install without knowing whether it will be good or bad for the 
company. 
"The shareholder, as another alternative. may wait to see if a 
better offer develops, but if he tenders late, he runs the risk that 
none of his shares will be taken. He may also sell his shares in the-
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to the target corporation as well as the Securities and 
Exchange Commission, Congress intended to do no more 
than give incumbent management an opportunity to ex-
press and explain its position. The Congress expressly 
disclaimed an intention to provide a weapon for manage-
ment to discourage takeover bids or prevent large ac-
cumulations of stock which would create the potential 
for such attempts. Indeed, the Act's draftsmen com-
mented upon the "extreme care" which was taken "to 
avoid tipping the balance of regulation either in favor 
of management or in favor of the person making the 
takeover bid." S. Rep. No. 550, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., 
p. 3 (1967); H. R. Rep. No. 1711, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., 
p. 4 (1968). See also Electronic Specialty Co. v. Inter-
national Controls Corp., 409 F. 2d 937, 947 (CA2 1969). 
The short of the matter is that none of the evils to 
which the Williams Act was directed has occurred 
or is threatened in this case. Petitioner has not at-
tempted to obtain control of respondent, either by a cash 
tender offer or any other device. Moreover, he has now 
filed a proper Schedule 13D, and there has been no sug-
gestion that he will fail to comply with the Act's require-
ment of reporting any material changes in the information 
contained therein. 15 U. S. C. § 78m (d)(2); 17 CFR 
§ 240.13d-2 (1974). On this record there is no likelihood 
that respondent's shareholders will be disadvantaged 
should petitioner make a tender offer, or that respondent 
will be unable to adequately place its case before them 
should a contest for control develop. Thus, the usual 
market and hope for the best. Without knowledge of who the bidder 
is and what he plans to do, the shareholder cannot reach an informed" 
decision." S. Rep . No. 550, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 2 (1967) . 
However, the Report also recognized "that takeover bids should' 
not be discouraged because they serve a useful purpose in providing; 
a. check on entrenched btli inefficient management. /d., at 3, 
' . 
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basis for injunctive relief, "that there exists some cogni-
zable danger of recurrent violation," is not present here. 
United States v. W. T. Grant Co., 345 U. S. 629, 633 
(1953). See also Vicksburg Waterworks Co. v. Vicks-
burg, 185 U. S. 65, 82 (1902). 
Nor are we impressed by respondent's argument that 
an injunction is necessary to protect the interests of its 
shareholders who either sold their stock to petitioner at 
predisclosure prices or would not have invested had they 
known that a takeover bid was imminent. Brief for 
Respondent, at 13, 20-21. As observed, the principal 
object of the Williams Act is to solve the dilemma of 
shareholders desiring to respond to a cash tender offer, 
and it is not at all clear that the type of "harm" identi-
fied by respondent is redressable under its provisions. 
In any event, those persons who allegedly sold at an un-
fairly depressed price have an adequate remedy by way 
of an action for damages, thus negating the basis for 
equitable relief.8 See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. 
Sawyer, 343 U. S. 579, 595 (1952) (opinion of Frank-
furter, J.). Similarly, the fact that the second group of 
shareholders for whom respondent expresses concern have 
retained the benefits of their stock and the lack of an 
imminent contest for control make the possibility of dam-
age to them remote at best. See Truly v. Wanzer, 5 
How. 141, 142-143 (1847). 
We turn, therefore, to the Court of Appeals' conclusion 
that respondent's claim was not to be judged according 
to traditional equitable principles, and that the bare 
fact that petitioner violated the Williams Act justified 
8 The Court was advised by respondent that such a suit is now 
pending in the District Court and clatJS action certification has been 
sought . Although we intimate no views regarding the merits of that 
case, that course provides a potential sanction for petitioner's viola-
1(ion of the Williams A.ct wh~ch is not insig_nificant. 
' . 
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entry of an injunction against him. This position would 
seem to be foreclosed by Hecht Co. v. Bowles, 321 U. S. 
321 (1944). There, the administrator of the Emergency 
Price Control Act of 1942 brought suit to redress viola-
tions of that statute. The fact of the violations was 
admitted, but the District Court declined to enter an 
injunction because they were inadvertent and the defend-
ant had taken immediate steps to rectify them. This 
Court held that such an exercise of equitable discretion 
was proper despite § 205 (a) of the Act, which provided 
that an injunction or other order "shall be granted" upon 
a showing of violation, obesrving: 
"We are dealing with the requirements of equity 
practice with a background of several hundred years 
of history. . . . The historic injunctive process was 
designed to deter, not to punish. The essence of 
equity jurisdiction has been the power of the Chan-
cellor to do equity and to mould each decree to the 
necessities of the particular case. Flexibility rather 
than rigidity has distinguished it. The qualities of 
mercy and practicality have made equity the instru-
ment for nice adjustment and reconciliation between 
the public interest and private needs as well as be-
tween competing private claims. We do not believe 
that such a major departure from that long tradition 
aa is here proposed should be lightly implied." 321 
U. S., at 329-330. (Emphasis added). 
This reasoning applies a fortiori to actions involving 
only "competing private claims," and suggests that the 
District Court here was entirely correct in insisting that 
respondent satisfy the traditional prerequisites of extraor-
dinary equitable relief by establishing irreparable harm. 
Moreover, the District Judge's conclusions that peti-
tioner acted in good faith and that he promptly filed a 
Schedule 13D when his attention was called to this obli-
74-415-0PINION 
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gation 9 support the exercise of its sound judicial dis-
cretion to deny an application for an injunction, relief 
which is historically "designed to deter, not to punish" 
and to permit the court "to mould each decree to the 
necessities of the particular case:" 321 U. S., at 329. As 
MR. JusTICE DouGLAS aptly pointed out in Hecht Co., 
the "grant of jurisdiction to issue compliance orders 
hardly suggests an absolute duty to do so under any 
and all circumstances." Ibid. (emphasis by Court) . 
Respondent urges, however, that the "public interest" 
must be taken into account in considering its claim for 
relief and relies upon the Court of Appeals' conclusion 
that it is entitled to an injunction because it "is in the 
best position" to ·insure that the Williams Act is complied 
with by purchasers of its stock. This argument miscon-
ceives, we think, the nature of the litigation. Although 
neither the availability of a private suit under the Wil-
liams Act nor respondent's standing to bring it has been 
questioned here, this cause of action is not authorized by 
the statute or its legislative history. Rather, respondent 
'is asserting a so-called implied private right of action 
established by cases such as J. 1. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 
U. S. 426 (1964). Of course, we have not hesitated to 
9 In its brief on the merits respondent argue; that "genuine issues 
of material fact exist as to the knowledge, motives, purposes and 
plans in [petitioner's] rapid acquisition of" its stock and that, at 
the very least, the case should be remanded for trial on these issuE:S. 
This pomt wa;; not raised in the petition for certiorari or respond. 
ent's opposition thereto, nor was it made the subject of a cross-
petition. Because it would alter the judgment of the Court of 
Appeals, which like that of the District Court had effectively put 
an end to the litigation, rather than providing an alternative ground 
for affirmmg it, we will not consider the argument when raised in 
this manner. See Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co ., 396 U. S. 375, 38! 
n . 4 (1970); Morley C'onstr . Co. v. Maryland Cas. Co., :300 U. S. 
185, 191-192 (1937) . Cf Wiener v. United States, 357 U. S. 349, 
a 51 n. * (1958), 
' 0 
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recognize the power of federal courts to fashion private 
remedies for securities laws violations when to do so is 
consistent with the legislative scheme and necessary for 
the protection of investors as a supplement to enforce-
ment by the Securities and Exchange Commission. Com-
pare J. I. Case Co. v. Borak, supra, with Securities 
Investor Protection Corp. v. Barbour, - U. S. -
( 1975). However, it by no means follows that the plain-
tiff in such an action is relieved of the burden of estab~ 
lishing the traditional prerequisites of relief. Indeed, our 
cases hold that quite the contrary is true. 
In Deckert v. Independence Shares Corp., 311 U. S. 
282 ( 1940), this Court was called upon to decide whether 
the Securities Act of 1933 authorized purchasers of securi~ 
ties to bring an action to resciml an allegedly fraudulent 
sale. The question was answered affirmatively on the 
basis of the statute's grant of federal jurisdiction to "en-
force any liability or duty" created by it. The Court's 
reasoning is instructive : 
"The power to enforce implies the power to make 
effective the right of recovery afforded by the Act. 
And the power to make the right of recovery effec-
tive implies the power to utilize any of the proce-
dures or actions normally available to the litigant 
according to the exigencies of the particular case. If 
petitioners' bill states a cause of action when tested 
by the customary rules governing suits of such char-
acter, the Securities Act authorizes maintenance of 
the suit . . . . " 311 U. S., at 288. 
In other words, the conclusion that a private litigant 
could maintain an action for violation of the 1933 Act 
meant no more than that traditional remedies were avail-
able to redress any harm which he may have suffered; 
it provided no basis for dispensing with the showing re-
quired to obtain relief. Significantly, this passage was 
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relied upon in Boark with respect to actions under the 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934. See 377 U. S., at 433-
434. ) Any uncertainty regarding the nature of relief avail-
able to a person asserting an implied private right of 
action under the Securities Laws was resolved in Mills v. 
Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U'. S. 375 ( 1970). There we 
held that complaining shareholders had proven their case 
under § 14 (a) of the 1934 Act by showing that mislead-
ing statements in a proxy solicitation were material and 
that the solicita·~ion itself "was an essential link in the 
accomplishment of" a merger. We concluded that any 
stricter standard would frustrate private enforcement of 
the proxy rules, but Mr Justice Harlan took pains to 
point out that: 
"Our conclusion that petitioners have established 
their case by showing that proxies necessary to ap-
proval of the merger were obtained by means of a 
materially misleading solicitation implies nothing 
about the form of relief to which they may be en-
titled. . . . In devising retrospective relief for viola-
tion of the proxy rules, the federal courts should 
consider the same factors that would govern the re-
lief granted for any similar illegality or fraud .... 
In selecting a remedy the lower courts should exer-
cise 'the sound discretion which guides the deter-
minations of courts of equity,' keeping in mind the 
role of equity as 'the instrument for nice adjustment 
and reconciliation between the public interest and 
private needs as well as between competing private 
claims.' " 396 U. S., at 386, quoting Hecht Co. v. 
Bowles, 321 U. S., at 329. (Emphasis supplied.) 
Considering further the remedies which might be ordered, 
we observed that "the merger should be set aside only 
if a court of equity concludes, from all the circumstances) 
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that it would be equitable to do so," and that "damages 
should be recoverable only to the extent that they can be 
shown." 396 U. S., at 388, 389. 
Mills could not be plainer in holding that the questions 
of liability and relief are separate in private actions under 
the Securities Laws, and that the latter is to be deter-
mined according to traditional principles. Thus, the fact 
that respondent is pursuing a cause of action which has 
been generally recognized to serve the public interest pro-
vides no basis for concluding that it is relieved of showing 
irreparable harm and other •usual prerequisites for 
injunctive relief. Accordingly, the judgment of the 
Court of Appeals is reversed and the case is remanded 
to it with directions to reinstate the judgment of th · 
District Court. 
So ordered. 
Memorandum to Justice Powell 
From Penny Clark 
Re: No. 74-415 Rondeau v. Mosinee Paper Corp. 
I have reviewed the opinion, and I see nothing that 
should prevent or delay your joining it. My only hesitation 
relates to something the opinion does not say: that it 
deals generally with the issuance of a permanent injunction 
following a completed violation of § 13(d), and~~: ca:e 
does not require decision on the availability of a preliminary 
injunction pending compliance with § 13(d). [That is, if 
the corporation learned that a shareholder had passed the 
5% mark and immediately sued to enjoin further purchases or the 
launching of a takeover bid 
/until he filed the necessary report.] I am uncertain whether 
such a situation would be covered by the standard formula 
' of "irreparable injury" but I am convinced that a preliminary 
injunction of that sort would be the best possible way to 
enforce § 13(d). 
I would not think it important enough to condition 
your join, but I wonder if we couldn't ask the Chief to 
add somewhere a footnote to the following effect: 
"Because this case involves only the availability 
of injunctive relief to remedy a § 13(d) violation 
following compliance with the reporting requirement, 
it does not require us to decide whether or under 
what circumstances a corporation could obtain a 
decree enjoining a shareholder who is currently in 
violation of § 13(d) from acquiring further shares, 
exercising voting rights, or launching a takeover 
bid, pending compliance with the reporting requirements o" 
penny 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE POTTER STEWART 
$>tipumt Qtuurl of tlft ~b $>bdt.&' 
~as-Jri:ngLm. ID. <q. zn&rJt. $ 
.June 4, 1975 
Re: No. 74-415, Rondeau v. Mosinee Paper Corp. 
Dear Chief, 
I am glad to join your opinion for the Court in this 
case. 
Sincerely yours, 
The Chief Justice 
Copies to the Conference 
CHAMBERS OF" 
JUSTICE POTTER STEWART 
~u:puntt <!JLlltrlttf tlrt 'J!fuitt~ ~fattg 
'J)iMlfi:ngill1t, lfJ. <!f. Zll~J!.~ 
June 5, 1975 
Re: No. 74-415, Rondeau v. Mosinee Paper Corp. 
Dear Chief, 
I think the proposed new footnote on page 9 is 
fine. 
Sincerely yours, 
The Chief Justice 
Copies to the Conference 
/ 
.iu,t"ttttt (lf.ntd of Urt ~tb ,jtatts 
Jfasfrin:ghttt. ~. <!f. zag;Jt.' 
CHAMI!IERS OF 
JUSTICE BYRON R . WHITE 
June 5, 1975 
Re: No. 74-415 - Rondeau v. Mosinee Paper Corp. 
Dear Chief: 
Join me, please. 
Sincerely, 
The Chief Justice 
Copies to Conference 
J 
CHAMBER S OF 
THE CHIEF JUSTICE 
. j)u:prttttt <!Jourl.ttf Iijt 'f.tb ~fet.ftg 
:JJa:gJri:ngLt~ ;!B. <!f. 211~,!,~ 
' . 
June 5, 1975 
Re: 74-415 - Rondeau v. Mosi n ee Paper Corp. 
MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERE NCE: 
A suggestion has been made that a footnote be added to the 
sentence on page 9 beginning with "Moreover •••• 11 
I 
"Because this case involves only the availability 
of injunctive relief to remedy a § 13(d) violation 
following compliance with the reporting requirement, 
it does not require us to decide whether or under 
what circumstances a corporation could obtain a 
decree enjoining a shareholder who is currently in 
violation of § 13(d) from acquiring further shares, 
exercising voting rights, or launching a takeover 
bid, pending compliance with the reporting require-
ments. 11 
This helps put a focus on alternative means of dealing with 
situations like this and it is acceptable to me. If those joining me 
have no objection, I am glad to add this. 
Regards, 
5, 1975 
No. Paper Corp. 
Please join me in your opinion for the Court. 
It does occur to me that it might be helpful to add 
a footnote, at some appropriate place, aLrnng the following 
linea: 
"~cause this case involves only the availability 
of injunctive relief to remedy a S 13(d) violation 
following compliance with the reporting requirement, 
it does not require us to decide whether or under 
what circumstances a corporation could obtain a 
decree enjoining a shareholder who is currently in 
violation of S 13{d) from acquiring further shares, 
exercising voting rights, or laundhing a takeover 
bid, pending compliance with the reporting requirements." 
' : Although I think such a note might be useful, I leave 
, this entirely to your judgment. 
Sincerely. 
The Chief Justice 
,, 
lfp/ss 
cc: The Conference 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE HARRY A . BLACKMUN 
~ttp-rtutt <!fttttrl cf t4t ~ttitt~ ~hdig 
~ZU!Irhtgtott. !9. <!f. 20,?-'*~ 
June 6, 1975 
Re: No. 74-415 - Rondeau v. Mosinee Paper Corp. 
Dear Chief: 
j 
Please join me in your circulation of June 4 as supple-
mented with the new footnote proposed for page 9. 
Sincerely, 
~te.l 
The Chief Justice 
cc: The Conference 
CHAMBERS OF" 
THE CHIEF JUSTICE 
.fr,;:-.rn:t ~M::-t <if tqt~~ ~tafts 
}:.as ~ri:n.gio n. iB- <!f. 20?.lt~ 
June 11, 197 5 
Re: 74-415 - Rondeau v. Mosinee Paper Co. 
MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE: 
/ 
To eliminate what could be read as an internal 
in<7onsistency between the statement on page 9 of my draft 
that "Petitioner has not attempted to obtain control, 11 and 
the disclosure quoted on page 4, I am adding a footnote keyed 
to the sentence ending with "attorney, 11 page 3, line 16: 
I 
Although some outstanding orders were 
filed after July 30, 1971, petitioner placed no 
new orders for respondent's stock after that date. 
Regards, 
CHAMBERS Of' 
.JUSTICE WILLIAM 0 . DOUGLAS 
.®tt.prrnu Qf01ttf of tire :lthtitc2t .§falcg 
'2-lasitingfon, ~. Qf. 2!l~JI-2 
June 11, 
Re: Rondeau v. Mosinee Paper Corp., No. 74-415 
Dear Bill: 
Please join me in your dissenting opinion. 
1975 V' 
Sincerely, 
William 0. Douglas 
Mr. Justice Brennan 
cc: The Conference 
CHAMBERS OF' 
~ttpum.t "fou.rt of tlr t 'Jfftti:tt~ ~taftll 
1naslyington.16. "f. 2ll.;t'!-.;t 
.JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHALL June 11, 1975 
Re: No. 74-415 -- Francis A. Rondeau v. Mosinee 
Paper Corporation 
Dear Bill: 
Please add to your dissent the following: 
"Mr. Justice Marshall also dissents. 11 
Mr. Justice Brennan 
cc: The Conference 
Sincerely, 
·_-;/ ( 
./, 
T. M. 
/ 
) 
) 
) 
T
H
E
 C
. J. 
W
. 0
. D
. 
W
. J. B
. 
P
. S. 
B
. R
. W
. 
T
. M
. 
H
. A
. B
. 
L. F
. P. 
W
.H
.R
. 
4
/2
8
/7
5
 
~
~
~
 
'~ UllA 
~
.
0
 ..... 
'C
J
 
~
c
.
J
 
~
-4\,6 • 
.,. j-
~
C
J
 hcC
f ~
c
9
 
~
-
,jyj...,'/ 
"-"\\'-)5
'" 
t---'-1·15 
G,-tl--7~ 
~
-
S
-
7
S
 
"
-
H
-
7
~
 
C
o
-
~
-
7
5
"
 
')5/?r 
t/" h
r 
t
a
f
~
 
b
-5
-7
5
 
~
~
 
-
'J 
I 
. ) 
-
-
74-415 R~deau v
. 
M
o
lin
ee P
ap
er 
